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Introduction1
By passing a series of laws known as ‘the so-called parity laws’ in 1999, 2000
and 2007,2 France became a model for equal political power-sharing between
men and women. This is decidedly paradoxical given that the results of the
1997 legislative elections — that is, before the laws were passed — ranked
France 42nd worldwide for proportion of women in the lower or single house
(10.9% women MPs), whereas the 2007 legislative elections put France in 58th
place with 18.5% women MPs. This means that while the parity laws have
allowed for some improvement in the proportion of women in parliament, the
advance was not as marked as in countries throughout the world whose
strategy has consisted of imposing quotas either by law or on the initiative of
political parties themselves (Se´nac-Slawinski, 2004, 2008).
How are we to understand this discrepancy between the parity principle
and what happens when it is translated into law and applied in elections
in France? In Parite´! Sexual equality and the crisis of French universalism,
Joan Wallach Scott (2005) explains that the 1999 constitutional revision and
the law of 2000 ‘resembled the kind of anti-discrimination measures that
the founders of the parite´ movement had hoped to improve on’; the move-
ment aimed ‘to rid political representation of the symbols of sexual difference
and so to fully include women in the figure of the universal’ (2005, 147).
While passage of the so-called parity law of 6 June 2000, may have suggested
that the question had been resolved, ‘it remains problematic given the
limitations of the law and resistance in the political field (the law applies
only to proportional list elections, and the increase in number of women
in local government is slight; meanwhile the number of women in the two
houses remains low, a situation due first and foremost to the low number
of women candidates presented by the major parties)’ (Leroux and Sourd,
2005, 76).
To shed some light on the strategies used to legitimate the constitutional
revision of 1999 and the law of 6 June 2000, Laure Bereni and Ele´onore
Le´pinard (2004) have analyzed the types of rhetoric used by pro- and anti-
paritarists before the laws were passed. I pursue their thinking here, analyzing
not justification of the genesis of the laws, but rather the issues involved
for political and NGO actors in appropriating the law, in connection with its
use in elections. To avoid any simplistic opposition between the transpartisan
alliance formed around getting the parity laws passed and the return of
standard political dividing lines after passage and early implementation of the
laws, it is important to point out the contextual and strategic dimension of
the alliance between women politicians on the right and left, an alliance
incarnated by the 1996 publication of the ‘Manifeste pour la Parite´.’ Analysis
of parliamentary debates3 and party documents,4 as well as interviews of
political party officials conducted in 1996, 1999, 2001 and 2002–2003 by the
Observatoire de la Parite´ entre les Femmes et les Hommes, an organization
within the Prime Minister’s office (Halimi and Bachelot, 1999; Gillot 2001;
Ge´nisson, 2003; Zimmermann, 2003), shows that before the laws were passed
there was a clear ideological cleavage between France’s leftist parties, including
the Parti Socialist (PS), who were directly active in the parity movement,
and France’s rightist parties, including the Rassemblement pour la Re´publique
(RPR, which in 2002 became the UMP: Union pour un Mouvement Populaire),
who had reservations about whether or not the laws were consistent with
France’s republican spirit.
Is it accurate to say, then, that on the eve of the 2007 legislative elections a
transpartisan consensus existed around the so-called parity laws? And if so
what was the nature of that consensus? France’s two major political parties, the
UMP and the PS, do agree that it was necessary to resort to binding legislation
to resolve the problem of low proportions of women elected officials, but how
have these two parties resolved the dialectic between the principle of
competition inherent in electoral contests and the new candidate parity
requirement?
In answering this question, I will be concerned not with quantitatively
assessing the effects of implemention of the law, a question amply treated in
institutional and academic studies (Fassin and Guiounet, 2002; Mossuz-Lavau,
2002, 2007; Sineau, 2004a; Ministe`re de la Parite´ et de l’Egalite´ Professionnelle,
2005; Pouvoirs locaux, 2005, 10–28; Territoires, 2006; Conseil Economique et
Social, 20075), but rather with how actors directly involved in the
implementation process justify the laws. My hypothesis is that while the
French parity movement involved strategic attenuation of the the right-left
split (Jenson and Valiente, 2003; Scott, 2005), the system for justifying or
legitimating parity (Bereni and Revillard, 2007), whether developed before-
hand (Mossuz-Lavau, 1998; Bereni and Le´pinard, 2004) or afterward, is split
when it comes to ‘ideological tinkering’ (bricolages ide´ologiques) (Bourricaud,
1980; Le´vi-Strauss, 1990, 30–49), and the substance of that tinkering confirms
the relevance of examining links between the political/party order, the social
order, and the sexual or gender order (Se´nac-Slawinski, 2007a, b).
To test this hypothesis I conducted a wide-ranging qualitative survey, the
aim of which was to critically compare discourses to practices, and norms to
rules, 5 years after the parity laws were first applied in the March 2001
municipal elections. I sought to analyze the argumentation systems used by
male and female UMP and PS politicians in charge of implementing the
parity principle, and by women representatives of feminist and/or women’s
NGOs, as this set of associations played a central role in the transpartisan
genesis of the parity laws. Between October 2005 and May 2006, I interviewed
83 persons: 23 NGO representatives, 33 UMP officials and 27 PS officials
at local and national levels. For both political parties there was a special
focus on one urban de´partement party section, Paris, and one rural one, the
Hautes-Pyre´ne´es. The political officials interviewed were chosen on the basis
of their responsibilities and roles in implementing the so-called parity laws.
I interviewed national and local election officials, de´partement section officials,
the various officials in charge of new party members, social issues and women’s
rights, to learn how they judge and analyze the effects that implementing
the parity laws has had on doing politics (choosing candidates and leaders,
training, etc.). The 33 UMP officials interviewed — 13 men and 20 women —
included Bernard Accoyer, president of the UMP group in the Assemble´e
Nationale and later president of that assembly; Roselyne Bachelot, UMP
assistant secretary-general and later minister of health, youth, sports and
community life; Jeanette Bougrab, national secretary for new members;
Christine Boutin, elections commissioner and later minister of housing and
urban affairs; Marie-He´le`ne Desesgaulx, national secretary in charge of
elections; Vale´rie Pe´cresse, UMP spokeswoman and later minister of higher
education and research; Be´renge`re Poletti, special appointee in charge of
women’s affairs; Marie-Jo Zimmermann, chief reporter of the Observatoire de
la Parite´; and Fabien de Saint-Nicolas, president of the party’s youth
organization ‘Jeunes Populaires.’ Among the 27 Socialist officials — 14 men
and 13 women — were Kader Arif, national secretary for de´partement sections;
Malek Boutih, national secretary for social issues; Laurent Fabius, the
party’s former second-in-command and former prime minister; Elisabeth
Guigou, party project commissioner and minister of justice at the time
the law was passed; Marylise Lebranchu, president of the Maison des Elus
and former minister; Laurence Rossignol, national secretary for women’s
rights; and Razzie Hamadi, president of the party’s youth movement
‘Mouvement de la Jeunesse Socialiste.’ The 23 NGO officials were all women;
the associations they represented included Action Catholique Ge´ne´rale
Fe´minine (ACGF), L’Assemble´e des Femmes; Conseil National des Femmes
Franc¸aises; Coordination Franc¸aise pour le Lobby Europe´en des Femmes;
Demain la Parite´; Femmes Avenir; Femmes, De´bat et Socie´te´; Mix-cite´; Ni
Putes Ni Soumises; Parite´ 50/50; Ruptures; and L’Union Fe´minine Civique
et Sociale.
The interviews were conducted in 2005 and 2006, the period leading up to the
2007 legislative and presidential elections. They brought to light three sources
of division: position with regard to a supposed social demand for parity in
France, debate around using quotas, and reservations about how the parity
principle had been translated into law. This thematic structuration allows for
discerning two distinct ideological frames of reference (Faure et al., 1995)
corresponding to two different conceptions of the republican spirit, particu-
larly as it pertains to the relationship between the principle of civic equality and
the reality of inequalities.
I first examine whether party and NGO representatives justify the so-called
parity laws as being a French translation of European Union (EU) equality
norms (Bo¨rzel and Risse, 2003). I then analyze the fact that 5 years after
passage of the law, party and NGO officials have appropriated it by means of
‘ideological tinkering’ that reflects partisan cleavages. The point is to examine
the particular French public policy known as the parity laws, and how that
policy has been legitimated after early implementation, by considering the
cognitive dimension of the discourses of national actors involved in
implementing those laws (Ladrech, 1994).
Women Active in the Parity Movement Refer to a European-Level
Movement to Institute Parity, Whereas French Political Party Officials
Cite the Efficiency of the French Parity Laws
To promote equal or balanced male and female participation in political
decision-making, many countries throughout the world — in Europe and Asia,
South America and Africa — have established quotas, either by law or on the
initiative of political parties themselves, to be realized either in terms of number
of candidates or number of elected officials (Se´nac-Slawinski, 2004, 2008).
Within the EU, the parity strategy raises the question of interactions between
European and international moves to institute parity and domestic national
contexts (Bereni, 2004; Sineau, 2004b; Le´pinard, 2007).
As early as November 1989, a seminar on ‘parity democracy’ was organized
at Strasbourg under the aegis of the Council of Europe. On this occasion, equal
representation of both sexes in decision-making spheres was posited as a
condition of pluralist democracy. In 1992, the European Commission pursued
this development, creating the expert network Women and Decision-making.
Meanwhile, the Action Programme on Equal Opportunities for Women and
Men, established by the European Council of Ministers in 1990, played an
important role in popularizing the idea of parity democracy. One of its effects
was to start mobilizing French political, intellectual and NGO actors. Parity
has been a public issue in France since 1992.
To make the connection between the move for parity at the EU level
and how it was ‘translated’ into the French parity laws, I use the typology
on Europeanization developed by Bo¨rzel (2002) and Cowles et al. (2001).
I consider not the first phase of Europeanization, called ‘the European
process’ (Bereni, 2004), but rather the phase described as one of adaptive
pressure, which involves identifying points that may block the Euro-
peanization process. ‘In Risse’s initial model, those points are grouped
together under the heading ‘‘national prisms’’ (NP), and they include
both institutional components and actors and/or cultural factors likely to
determine how European norms and policy are received’ (Saurugger and Surel,
2006, 189).
In the 83 interviews I conducted, the only persons to mention EU influence
on French so-called gender policies (Caporaso and Jupille, 2001) — that is, on
French public policy to promote sexual equality, particularly the so-called
parity laws — were women who had been involved in France’s parity
movement. They are all positioned at points of intersection between European
or international networks and French ones, either at the NGO, political party,
institutional, or university level. Roselyne Bachelot, Monique Dental,
Franc¸oise Gaspard, Monique Halpern and Yvette Roudy all testified to the
gradual emergence of the EU parity principle in the French context.
Following Radaelli’s typology (2003), these five women politicians and
NGO representatives were active in institutional and cognitive transfer in the
field of gender policy by way of three Europeanization processes: construction,
diffusion and institutionalization. In their activity of ‘translating’ the norm and
the European legal framework of ‘parity democracy’ into the French national
context, they illustrate these three figures of Europeanization. The process
chosen by French political party officials to justify the laws is different from
the one used by women active in the parity movement. French political party
officials do not cite the legitimating role of the EU project, but refer instead to
the effectiveness of the French laws. This is particularly true of UMP officials,
who state that they overcame their ideological reservations and rallied for
pragmatic purposes to the idea that the legislative tool had to be used to attain
balanced representation of the sexes in political life.
How the normative framework of ‘parity democracy’ emerged on the French
political, NGO and media scenes: cognitive and institutional transfers
In Transforming Europe, Lisa Conant (2001) uses a case study to show that the
reason EU parity norms could be applied early and broadly in Great Britain is
that the country had a series of adminstrative organizations and agencies
capable of seizing the opportunity offered by the EU decision and using it to
promote reforms in national law. France, with its 1999 constitutional reform
and the laws of 2000, together known as ‘the so-called parity laws,’ is different
from the British model because while parity is considered a good practice
securely rooted in the specificity of national political history, it also illustrates
the strength of resistance on the part of political entrepreuners (Murray, 2004;
Sineau, 2004a). I call into question this hypothesis of French specificity by
analyzing the positions of UMP and PS party officials and feminist and/or
women’s NGOs from the standpoint of the emergence of a normative
framework for ‘parity democracy’ on the French political, association and
media scenes.
It should be recalled that the demand for parity appeared on French activist
scenes — political parties and NGOs — as early as the 1970s. That demand
acquired legitimacy in the late 1980s under the combined influence of
international conferences and national models such as the German Green
Party’s official commitment to equal male–female representation, announced
in 1986. French women ‘paritarists,’ active themselves on the international and
EU scenes, became spokeswomen for the normative and legal European
framework of ‘parity democracy.’
Monique Dental, the founding president of ‘Collectif Fe´ministe Ruptures’,
explained in our interview that the parity principle naturally acquired
legitimacy in movements that combined a leftist alternative perspective with
an ecologist and feminist one. For this fundamental actor in the emergence of
the parity demand in the French context, the EU gender politics framework
was what enabled that demand to move beyond the militant activist sphere and
become visible and justifiable. She created the ‘Arc-en-Ciel’ (Rainbow)
movement, one of the first to speak out in favor of political parity. In 1987,
in a text entitled Ruptures, Cahiers du Collectif de Pratiques et de Re´flexions
Fe´ministes, this movement published the following declaration: ‘Feminists
posit the necessity of conceiving a mode of collective functioning based on
parity between men and women in organizational structures.’ Femmes pour la
Parite´, the first network devoted to achieving parity, was created in early 1993
by this feminist collective, soon after the first summit of the European
Community Commission, ‘Women in Power,’ held in Athens in November
1992. Femmes pour la Parite´ drafted the ‘Manifeste des 577 pour une
de´mocratie paritaire,’ published in Le Monde on 19 November 1993. Signed by
a large number of intellectuals (288 men and 289 women), the text called for an
organic law stipulating that ‘elected assemblies at local and national levels are
to be composed of as many women as men.’
Franc¸oise Gaspard, France’s current representative to the UN’s CEDAW
convention (Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against
Women), recalls the role of intermediary she played between the EU level
and the national prism at the academic, association and political levels (Bataille
and Gaspard, 1999). The idea of parity was ‘launched’ in 1992 with a book she
co-authored with Claude Servan-Schreiber and Anne Le Gall: Au pouvoir
citoyennes: liberte´, e´galite´, parite´ (a play on the words from the Marseillaise
‘Aux armes citoyens!’ and the celebrated national motto ‘Liberte´, Egalite´,
Fraternite´’). The book called for inscribing parity into law: ‘Elected assemblies
at the territorial as well as national levels should be composed of as many
women as men.’ Franc¸oise Gaspard was active in the Athens ‘Women in
Power’ summit. Attended by women ministers and women former ministers,
this summit culminated in the adoption of a charter proclaiming parity a
democratic objective. On 3 November 1992, the summit ‘closed with the
adoption of a declaration that included the following statements: ‘‘Women
represent more than half of the population. Equality requires parity in the
representation and administration of nations.’’ NGOs disseminated the text of
the ‘‘Athens declaration’’ throughout the EU countries, particularly in France
(Hubert, 1998)’ (Gaspard, 2003, 1).
Yvette Roudy, minister for women’s rights from 1981 to 1986 and MEP
from 1979 to 1981, clearly states that she had to act at a number of different
levels: associations, political legislative and executive institutions, EU and
national institutions. As she sees it, the NGO networks created in the 1990s
and the series of ‘media coups’ were needed to counterbalance the French
political parties’ marked lack of commitment to the parity movement. She
founded and presided over the EU Parliament’s committee on women’s rights
and gender equality. She is also founding president of L’Assemble´e des
Femmes, an NGO created in 1992 to write parity into the French constitution
and French institutions as a political, social and economic issue. L’Assemble´e
des Femmes clearly aimed to use its NGO status to push the parity issue
beyond the party sphere and political cleavages. Yvette Roudy affirms that the
importance of such associations is proportional to the weakness of democracy
within the political parties. On her initiative, a ‘Manifeste pour la Parite´’ was
published in the weekly magazine L’Express on 6 June 1996. The text was
signed by 10 women former ministers on the left and right, including Miche`le
Barzach (minister of health and the family in the 1986–1988 Chirac
government), Edith Cresson (PS MP who in 1991 became France’s first
woman prime minister), Catherine Lalumie`re (secretary-general of the Council
of Europe in 1989) and Simone Weil (minister of health and the family).
Generally speaking, it served to make national-level women politicians’
commitment to parity fully visible.
Roselyne Bachelot, MEP and UMP assistant secretary-general at the time of
our interview in 2006, served as the first chief reporter for the Observatoire
de la Parite´ in 1995. Bachelot interprets political party resistance as a mirror
of resistances still operative in French society. She justifies resorting to
legislative means in the name of law’s mission to render justice. She defended
the law inside her party and against her party’s government: ‘Is it law that
determines mores and lifestyles? To quote the parish priest Lacordaire, ‘‘When
the strong oppress the weak, law is what protects liberty, and liberty
itself becomes a source of oppression.’’’ She is conscious of the fact that
‘conceptually and intellectually, parity upsets our collective unconscious,
particularly our adherence to republican universalism. We rubbed a lot of
people the wrong way.’ This last remark is particularly significant given
that she herself went against the ideological stance of her political camp.
Like Christiane Papon, president of the Gaullist women’s movement Femmes
Avenir for 13 years (1975–1988) and honorary president of that association
at the time of our interview,6 who related to me how Jacques Chirac
gradually came around to the idea that the only way to attain the goal
of parity was through legislation, Roselyne Bachelot expressed her immense
satisfaction at having participated in the struggle against the ‘phenomenon
of blindness’ consisting in male politicians — including her father — not
seeing the women around them as full-fledged politicians. She acknowledges
with regret that the fact that her party rallied to the so-called parity laws,
which it understands as temporary ‘catch-up’ measures, has not changed the
social and political order, still founded on sexual difference and a gender
hierarchy. As she sees it, discrimination endures because it has not been
decoded.
We see that the normative framework of ‘parity democracy’ emerged on the
French NGO and media scenes by way of cognitive and institutional transfers
in a French context marked by political party resistance to the parity demand.
For rightist political parties, as we shall see further on, that resistance is explicit
and grounded in ideology, whereas for leftist parties it is implicit; on the left,
blockage is linked first and foremost to the issue of attaining and remaining in
power.
To conclude this section, it is interesting to note that in 2006, that is, 10 years
after the ‘Manifeste pour la Parite´,’ Monique Halpern, president of the French
committee of the European women’s lobby (CLEF), acknowledged that parity
was no longer the committee’s first priority, despite the fact that it is composed
of associations that incarnate the transnational and EU dimension of the parity
demand. For her this means that paradoxically, parity is no longer a French
priority — it is no longer at the top of either the national or EU political
agenda.
Beyond the transpartisan aspect of the French parity movement, the political
cleavage persists around ‘concept-method’ of parity (Fraisse, 2001, 311–324)7
In early 1994, following the 1993 scission of the Femmes pour la Parite´
network, Franc¸oise Gaspard, Claude Servan-Schreiber and Colette Kreder
began developing a new network, Demain la Parite´ (Parity tomorrow),
purporting to be a place for exchange among all NGOs in favor of parity, a
network that would transcend the right-left split. Demain la Parite´ brought
together associations as diverse as ACGF, Association des Femmes Diploˆme´es
des Universite´s (AFDU), Coordination Franc¸aise pour le Lobby Europe´en
(CLEF), Elles Aussi, and L’Union Fe´minine Civique et Sociale (UFCS). The
fact that the oldest French feminist women’s association, the Conseil National
des Femmes Franc¸aises (CNFF), founded in 1901, joined this network
demonstrated the parity movement’s ability to reactivate the French feminist
association tradition. Demain la Parite´ had a total of two million members. On
9 January 1996, it organized a conference at UNESCO entitled ‘Women in
Decision-making.’ One particularity of the French parity movement, then, is
that it worked to attenuate the right–left cleavage as early as 1992 (Gaspard
et al., 1992; Scott, 2005). The movement’s transpartisan dimension is due in
part to the fact that the demand is for political equality; this point has been
separated out from party differences on the issue of access to social equality for
women. In this it contrasts with other parity movements — particularly Spain’s
(Jenson and Valiente, 2003) — confined to the left side of the political
spectrum, because the demand for parity is defined as a means of attaining
social gender equality rather than as a priority in itself.
However, it is essential to note that the transpartisan dimension of the
French association movement for parity does not work against but is actually
linked to the persistence of political cleavages around the parity demand. The
party and NGO leaders I questioned explain the French specificity of the
strategic alliance among diverse NGOs as due to French political party
resistance, resistance that continued to be expressed by rightist parties during
the debate on and around the parity laws. To test this hypothesis, I
supplemented the material collected in the qualitative survey with other
sources, such as hearings of the Observatoire de la Parite´ and parliament
session minutes.
On the basis of numerous hearings of association leaders and party officials,
the 1996 report of the Commission pour la Parite´ entre les Hommes et les
Femmes dans la Vie Politique, coordinated by Gise`le Halimi, noted a contrast
between the unified position of the women’s NGO movement and the divergent
views expressed by the political parties. The aim of the NGOs was equality in
politics; for them, the only fair proposition was parity. Party leaders,
meanwhile, though unanimous in deploring the underrepresentation of women
in French political life, differed on what the solution should be, and
acknowledge that they did not apply parity in composing their decision-
making bodies. Only four of the 48 members of the RPR’s Bureau Politique
were women, and on 9 November 1996, the party’s national council ‘rejected
the proposal to use legislative means to institute a quota for women, preferring
‘‘internal [party] arrangements’’ and urging [the party] to enlist women as
supple´antes8 in legislative elections, where priority is given to incumbents’
(Halimi and Bachelot, 1999, 25). The PS, on the other hand — women at the
time accounted for nearly 30% of its Secre´tariat National and Bureau National
— presented the following results for a poll of its members: ‘75.98% of party
activists approve putting the principle of male–female parity into the statutes;
11.59% are opposed; and 13.43% abstain. The Conseil National thus
unanimously (minus two) adopted the principle as a goal and fixed a minimum
percentage for the 1998 legislative elections, to be reached by having the
de´partement sections themselves reserve certain electoral districts for women.
For regional elections ‘‘the aim is to move toward 50%’’’ (Halimi and
Bachelot, 1999, 25).
The report submitted by the Observatoire de la Parite´ to the Prime Minister
in September 1999 once again testified to diverging RPR and PS positions on
parity, though there was transpartisan consensus in favor of party candidacy
quotas. Marie-Jo Zimmermann, then chief Observatoire reporter and RPR
speaker at the joint congress of France’s legislative houses held in Versailles in
June 1999 in connection with the constitutional reform, stated: ‘Awareness was
belated at the RPR, but I think it became real as early as the [1998] regional
elections, when 30% of electable candidates were women. The [1999] European
Union election lists headed by Nicolas Sarkozy showed that it was easy to set
up lists that alternate a man, a woman, a man, a woman — because there was a
real political will to allow women to accede to European Parliament mandates’
(Gillot, 2001, 93).
The moves by women activists representing a varied constellation of NGOs
to make parity a reality were thus echoed by the support for quotas across the
political party board. Party candidacy quotas gradually became not just a
political issue but also an instrument in the hands of the politicians. However,
party divergences persisted on the notion of parity itself. The PS — speaking in
this report through Yvette Roudy — recalled that it had ‘demonstrated it was
not opposed to introducing quotas into law (the PS had in fact proposed this in
1982)’ (Gillot, 2001, 92): ‘Following the Government project to modify the
Constitution so that France would have binding laws with which to attain the
goal of parity, we made the following proposition: we should plan to achieve
parity among elected officials immediately. A list will have to obey this
principle if it is to be accepted’ (Gillot, 2001, 91). RPR spokesperson Marie-Jo
Zimmermann, on the other hand, said she did not like the term ‘parity’: ‘I find
it degrading for a woman, unless she is in fact very fine. I prefer the term
‘‘equal access,’’ and giving women the conditions that will allow them that
access. Moreover, I am not really in favor of quotas, because they would
relaunch the debate around ‘‘Why not quotas for blacks or North Africans,’’
and I think we have to be very cautious on this point. A process is now under
way, and I am confident that the women in place will allow that process to
continue’ (Gillot, 2001, 96).
Analytic accounts of the parliamentary debates likewise illustrate the issues
involved in rightist MP resistance against making parity a legal obligation.
Some expressed their concern about a reform they considered too abrupt given
the gradual evolution of mentalities. They also pointed out that the reform
could produce disorder if it called into question the ‘complementarity of men
and women.’9
After the parity laws were passed, the position of the parties on the right
evolved: they rallied to the beneficial effects of the law. When Serge Pelletier,
then RPR secretary-general, was questioned by the Observatoire de la Parite´ in
late 2001, he stated that ‘Miche`le Alliot-Marie [RPR president at the time of
that hearing] is not in favor of instating a legal obligation, which she considers
insulting to women. Indeed, as she sees it, the drawback of the parity law is that
it associates women candidates with a numerical requirement rather than with
their abilities. For me, implementation of the law has shown that fortunately
this risk has not developed. The women candidates were recognized for their
abilities and their commitments’ (Ge´nisson, 2003, 159). In 2003, then UMP
president Alain Juppe´ began his hearing before the Observatoire de la Parite´ by
pointing out that ‘the first lesson offered by our assessment of the
consequences of implementation of the parity laws is positive: this law has been
useful in starting a movement that is advancing in the right direction’
(Zimmermann, 2003, 45).
The Process of Justifying ‘Parity’ After the Law was Passed: ‘Ideological
Tinkering’ Around the Strategic Reference to a Coherent Party Line
The present analysis, situated at the intersection of gender studies and the
study of political parties, explores an as-yet relatively undeveloped field.10
Paradoxically, there is little French analysis of the gender dimension of party
activism in terms of political actor norms (Paoletti, 2005) — in contrast to the
situation in English-language research. According to Alan Ware (1996), who
compared different national systems for selecting candidates and leaders, what
characterizes France is that the parties are free to choose their candidates; they
are not restricted by any legal measures — in contrast to the situation in
Germany and the United States, for example. Alan Ware explained the low
percentage of women candidates and women elected officials in French
legislative elections by the fact that women are at a disadvantage because party
selection is based on a form of careerism: local recognition precedes national
recognition. This logic is expressed particularly clearly in the fact that French
officials can simultaneously hold both local and national offices. Rainbow
Murray (2004, 347–362) supports the hypothesis that French political parties
are autonomous by showing that adoption of the so-called parity laws did not
call into question or change the criteria for choosing candidates for legislative
elections. The answers that Franc¸ois Hollande, head of the PS, gave to the
Observatoire de la Parite´ in 2003 corroborate this hypothesis. He affirmed that
despite the positive effects of the parity laws, ‘men are still the ones doing the
talking in political decision-making spheres. The forms and rites of politics and
the way of doing politics are still essentially founded on the criteria of
authority, charisma and legitimacy’ (Zimmermann, 2003, 86). It is in this
perspective that parity’s vocation for changing politics and democracy is
conceived: parity is supposed to ‘break with the vertical, descending concept of
power’ and is ideally to be applied not only to political representation but to all
areas of social democracy (Contribution the´matique au Congre`s PS de Dijon,
2003).
Above and beyond the immobilism of political game rules overall, my survey
brought to light the way in which parity was introduced into party game rules.
To formalize the survey results, I sought to develop a typology in terms of two
types of ‘ideological tinkering’ used in response to the legally binding parity
constraint. The UMP shows loyalty to Nicolas Sarkozy’s vision of equitable
liberalism, a vision that includes the use of positive discrimination measures
(Conseil d’analyse de la socie´te´, 2005), whereas in the PS we find loyalty to a
republican understanding that conceives differences within equality and
denounces the ideal of equal opportunity as a myth.
A typology of French political actors’ reception and appropriation of parity
The qualifiers used to define parity by the men and women actors I interviewed
alternated between virtues and vices, strong points and limitations. Beyond
these divergences, however, a consensus emerged, a general recognition that
legislation on parity was necessary — though the point is recognized as a
legitimate subject for intellectual debate, particularly in connection with
defining republican universalism. It is interesting to note that views of these
laws are structured by the party dimension. UMP and rightist or apolitical
women’s and/or feminist associations recognize the parity laws as a necessary
‘catching-up’ measure, but one that should be ‘biodegradable,’ whereas PS
officials and leftist associations see the laws as a ‘cultural revolution’ that is
also a source of political credibility. However, the dissonances between loyalty
to the party line and what certain party officials actually said show that the
ideological tinkering I have chosen to present in the form of two ideal-typical
models is in fact questioned within each party and represents a source of
tension.
On the one hand — and above and beyond a few dissonant chords such as
those sounded by Isabelle Debre´, senator from the Hauts-de-Seine, and
Christine Boutin11 — the discourse of the majority of UMP officials and
representatives of rightist or apolitical women’s and/or feminist associations
was characterized by an ideological recoding of parity, a reappropriation of it,
or ‘conversion’ to it. These respondents acknowledged both their initial
opposition to or reluctance to accept the parity laws as they were coming into
being, and the fact that they later rallied to the legislation, which they had
come to perceive as ‘a necessary evil.’ After denouncing the laws as contrary to
the republican spirit, they now considered them consistent with liberal ideology
(Jobert, 1994) and they justified their use by thinking of them as temporary
corrective measures serving the cause of equal opportunity. Following this
recoding, parity was defined by the thirty UMP officials I interviewed as one of
the earliest applications of what constituted an ideological marker of then
UMP president Nicolas Sarkozy, namely, the promotion of universalism in
diversity through positive discrimination ‘a` la franc¸aise’ (Koubi and Gugliemi,
2000; Tsujimura and Lochak, 2006) or the ‘republican quota,’ to quote Je´roˆme
Chartier, MP for the Val d’Oise and currently UMP national secretary for
party training and leadership activities. In sum, the parity principle is defined
as a translation of the equity principle into a positive discrimination measure.
In the 2005 report of the Conseil d’Analyse de la Socie´te´, a department that
has been part of the President’s Office since July 2004, Nicolas Sarkozy cited
the need to overcome French ‘prudishness about positive discrimination’
(Conseil d’analyse de la socie´te´, 2005, 291): ‘I use the term ‘‘positive
discrimination’’ — while being well aware of its limitations and the
misunderstandings it may cause — [because] if I just speak of ‘‘republican
voluntarism’’ the debate won’t get off the ground.’ (290–291). He does not
deny that ‘at the level of principles, there is something y worrying, even
humiliating about quotas. This said, quotas also have their legitimacy for
unblocking a situation — and if there’s a time limit on them.’ He therefore sees
the debate ‘for or against quotas’ as reductive: ‘I don’t reject quotas
categorically if there’s a time limit on them. And as I see it, this also goes
for parity. Without parity, it would have taken us 40 years to free up the
situation. With a quota — and 50% is a quota — we can hope to free up the
situation more quickly. I only regret that we didn’t put a time limit on it, that
the quota wasn’t established for a certain amount of time only’ (295).
Moreover, concluding the 7 March 2006, UMP convention entitled ‘Femmes,
libres et e´gales,’ Nicolas Sarkozy declared: ‘Women are subjected to
discrimination, but they also start off with handicaps, namely in terms of
educational degrees and training.’ On women’s place in politics, Sarkozy
noted: ‘The law on parity can hardly remove all these obstacles. But it has
removed the obstacle of discrimination’ (Discours de Nicolas Sarkozy, 2006).
On the other side, Socialist officials and leftist NGO representatives also
understand the parity principle as the advent of a new republican principle.
However, in contrast to UMP officials and heads of rightist or apolitical
women’s and/or feminist associations, they point to their own ongoing support
for parity, from its genesis to it translation in legal and election terms. To
paraphrase Jean-Pierre Cheve`nement, Socialist Minister of the Interior in 2000,
parity is a ‘cultural revolution’ whose purpose is to move beyond the hypocrisy
of the egalitarian republican myth by making equal sharing of political power a
condition for living together as equal and different. During the first reading of
the so-called parity bill in the Senate on 29 Febrary 2000, Cheve`nement
explained that ‘without going back over the details of these measures, I would
first stress that it is urgent to strengthen and even to refound our democracyy
In seeking to attain equal access to elected offices and functions12 for men and
women, this government is certainly not calling republican principles into
question — it is deepening those principles. The government has chosen parity
— that is, equality. And parity is exactly the opposite of quotas!’13
Cheve`nement was speaking at precisely the time that rightist parties, as
Roselyne Bachelot explained, were coming to support the parity laws in the
name of using quotas as a tool for reaching or moving closer to equity. The
understanding of parity I found among Socialist party and leftist NGO
officials thus illustrates one characteristic of the Mouvement Paritaire
according to Joan Scott: ‘Only a law that implemented a new principle of
equality could begin the process of structural and ideological change required
for the reconceptualization of women as individuals’ (2005, 74). Franc¸oise
Laurant, president of the Mouvement Franc¸ais pour le Planning Familial
(MFPF), confirms this hypothesis, specifying that parity was ‘a political duty
that imposed itself on them [leftist leaders] because it answered the hopes of the
society, particularly young people.’ Josy Poeyto, PS national official for
women’s rights, confirmed this position, speaking of ‘worldwide support [for
parity]’ and ‘the rise of women in politics throughout the world. It was also a
case of citizens attaining awareness ahead of politicians.’14
Signatories to the Contribution to the November 2000 ‘Dialoguer,
Diagnostiquer, De´cider ensemble’ conference in Grenoble recall that the
parity principle was first advocated by the women’s movement before being
formulated as legislation on the initiative of a Socialist government. They warn
that the Socialists must not ‘belie their efforts by timid, fearful or restricted
implementation of the law, at the risk of tarnishing credibility [of the PS].’ ‘As
one element of the democratization of politics, parity is the central component
of the new social contract the Socialists are proposing to the French. The parity
spirit is an innovative expression of the republican spirit in the etymological
sense of the Republic as the thing that belongs to all. This spirit is founded on
the right of every individual, regardless of personal characteristics, to have
access, at equal value, to an equal place in society.’ In April 2008, the PS
presented its Projet de de´claration de principe,’ drafted by the Commission de
Re´novation du Parti. The declaration is defined as a Socialist Party
‘identification card.’ Article 14 states: ‘The Socialist Party is feminist and acts
in favor of the emancipation of women. It works for equality between men and
women and the mixing of the sexes in society.’ It is interesting to note that
while the PS claims to be feminist, there is no reference in this article to the
parity demand in the sense of equal power-sharing.
Women’s political legitimacy: conditional equality
Above and beyond diverging ideological approaches, there is one view that all
the political parties have in common: the parity principle is in competition
with, and possibly runs contradictory to, the struggle to accede to power
(Troupel, 2002). Beyond the truism of the struggle for power, respondents from
different political parties and traditions have different ways of defining the
gender aspect of the activist screen.
Furthermore, how gender affects what is involved in committing to and
working for a political party is defined differently in the PS and the UMP.
According to Marie-Pierre Badre´, president of Parite´ 50/50, a group of
associations on the political right, leftist women do not feel as guilty as rightist
women about being professionally engaged in political activities because leftist
women are practicing the historic battle for autonomy within the ‘ham and
salad culture.’ That expression incarnates that fact that when leftist women go
to a political meeting they just leave ‘everything needed for dinner in the
fridge.’ Similarly, Roselyne Bachelot regrets that what she calls the ‘Barzach
syndrome’ puts women on the right ‘at the mercy’ of their protectors. For her,
‘women who are hesitant about jumping into the fray run the risk of having a
very short career’ because ‘when you no longer please, you pay a lot for favors.’
The world of politics, particularly the political party world, is ‘a distorting
mirror that reflects an image of the society back to itself. Women’s self-
censorship in politics refers back to the norms that girls internalize when they
think they can’t have certain careers or choose certain directions’ — a sort of
‘Stockholm syndrome’ observable in many women, who ‘reassure men with
guarantees and apologize for taking power.’15
In this connection, Se´gole`ne Royal’s 2007 presidential candidacy was
obviously a precedent, and it raises the issue of the perception of gender as a
political resource to be used in party undertakings. Segole`ne Royal’s candidacy
may be considered a phenomenon since it brought to light for the first time in
France the gender taboo associated with the position of supreme democratic
power: President of the Republic. The Socialist candidate, the first woman in a
position to become the father of the nation, continually subverted routine
practice of the political game rules, particularly party rules, without ever giving
up their necessary unction. Royal had to deal with strong resistance in her own
political party due in large part to the fact that she practiced that subversion in
the name of female otherness, an otherness overtly proclaimed and
symbolically invested throughout the campaign. Citing the example of
Margaret Thatcher, ‘who didn’t change a thing in power relations,’ Roselyne
Bachelot declared that she would rather see 250 women in the French
parliament than a woman president of the Republic. But UMP, PS and
women’s and/or feminist association officials all presented Se´gole`ne Royal’s
candidacy as the symbol of a change in power relations and therefore the sign
that ‘the Stockholm syndrome’ had been ‘overcome.’
The Se´gole`ne Royal phenomenon thus illustrates the fact that despite the
parity laws, the political norms operative in France are in fact characterized by
conditional equality when it comes to women’s legitimacy in politics.
Implementation of the laws has shown that the presence of women in politics
is accepted on condition that gender complementarity is put forward in election
campaigns as the source of women’s legitimacy. One discursive construction,
then, conceived as a response to the proportion crisis and reappropriated by
certain women politicians, emphasizes ‘the positive differences that character-
ize them [women]: they are said to be ‘‘less ambitious, more disinterested, more
altruistic, more concrete’’ than men. These features correspond to those used in
opinion polls at the time [during the 2001 municipal election campaigns] for the
description of the ideal mayor: a mayor should possess the qualities of
‘‘availability’’ and ‘‘proximity’’’ (Fleury-Vilatte and Walter, 2005, 12). Citing
the first corpus of studies on parity implementation, Sandrine Le´veˆque claims
that parity has had the paradoxical effect of ‘reinforcing gender stereotypes’
(2005, 502).16
By founding the legitimacy of power-sharing between the sexes on the ‘value-
added’ that women politicians bring to public action, parity has in fact
reinforced asymmetry between the sexes in politics (Achin et al., 2007). This
was confirmed by a UMP national secretary in my survey, who stated that
being female was an advantage as long as it did not constitute a critical threat.
He is delighted to say that elected women officials have brought a plus: ‘a
different vision of politics,’ ‘more active, more concerned with details and the
concrete’; ‘they didn’t bring anything regressive.’ As he sees it, women should
change the mode of intellectual functioning by introducing greater pragmatism
and attention to the concrete, while accepting the rules of the political game —
particularly the pace. ‘Saying ‘‘I can’t see you because I have to pick my child
up from school’’ is regressive. It’s the same as if you said, ‘‘I can’t because I’m
playing tennis.’’’ And he defined the situation of women candidates as follows:
‘It’s like when you join a club: you accept the rules of the game.’
Party appropriation of parity raises the question of the political dimension in
the sense of power relations and the gendered public/private split. The
philosopher Genevie`ve Fraisse sheds light on this point in stating that parity
‘is more of a word than a concept: it is a tool for manufacturing equality.
Once we think of it as an instrument, it becomes easy to understand that it is
aimed . at any situation of political power inside or outside politics’ (Fraisse,
2001, 319).
Conclusion
From the late 1980s to today, there has been much debate on what strategies
should be used to combat the underrepresentation of women in politics. These
debates raise questions about interactions between EU recommendations and
national contexts in connection with the gender dimension. As a response to
international and EU hopes and expectations, the so-called parity laws in effect
in France since the year 2000 are both an application of fundamental
democratic principles and what may be called an ambivalent institutional tool
characterizing the French context. Paradoxically, whereas these laws are
generally thought of as exemplary when it comes to power-sharing between the
genders, they have not positioned France any better than 18th of all EU
countries for proportion of women MPs (national level). This is can be
explained by the fact that the so-called parity laws are binding only for list
elections; for legislative elections they are only strongly encouraged.
My study of the discourses on parity used by party and NGO officials
reveals that there is little awareness of the role played by the EU in gender
politics; there is instead a feeling that France is exceptional. The rhetorical
strategy is to integrate the legal constraint of parity as the expression of an
ideological syncretism. Most of the actors I interviewed proudly declared that
the parity law is an expression of French exemplarity. The women directly
involved in the parity movement are the only ones who presented this gender
policy as a process designed in response to a EU initiative. They point out that
the history of the expression ‘parity democracy’ shows the obvious link
between the globalization of gender politics and local — that is, national —
retranscription.
More than 6 years after the June 1999 constitutional revision, the
appropriation of the so-called parity laws by France’s political parties may
be described as ‘ideological tinkering’ in the sense that these laws were not
conceptualized specifically but rather made consistent with party lines,
meaning that ‘the possible combinations are limited by the fact that they are
borrowed from language where they already have a meaning, and this restricts
maneuvering room’ (Le´vi-Strauss, 1990, 33). National rhetoric is preponderant
in the ideological tinkering, and little account is given to the European
heritage.
This study of the processes by which parity has been justified after it was
approved and implemented points to the tendency in France to nationalize the
issues involved in this ‘concept-method.’ While the wish is to break definitively
with the ‘myth of the French exception’ (Bereni and Le´pinard, 2004), a myth
briefly reactivated during the recent presidential campaign, the new interest in
gender within French political science that has been fueled by the ‘parity’
research object should find its full place in transversal thinking on the concept
of parity democracy. This thinking, as pursued in the framework of vast
comparative projects,17 should show how the conceptual dimension of the
parity principle fits with concrete application of various types of quotas
(Mateo Diaz, 2005).
In departing from the principle of equal rights to promote equal
opportunity, the so-called parity laws resonate with the international debate
on using positive discrimination measures while reappropriating the French
political heritage of ‘republican universalism.’ It is in this perspective that the
‘ideological tinkering’ analyzed here illustrates how normative frames under-
stood until now to be irreconcilable can in fact cohabit. In the understanding of
Gwe´nae¨le Calve`s, the parity laws can be ‘established as a model of a catch-up
policy for two unequal groups: men and women in politics. This is not an
entirely irrelevant way of presenting the issue, but it obliterates the
fundamental originality of a policy in which the criterion for evaluating the
constitutionality of positive discrimination measures becomes a matter
involving the doctrine of national sovereignty’ (Calve`s, 2004, 84).
Notes
1 My thanks to the CEVIPOF — Center for Political Research at Sciences Po, where I did my
post-doctoral studies, and to my CNRS research center, the Centre Maurice Halbwachs (CNRS
— Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales — Ecole Normale Supe´rieure), for its support,
particularly in funding the translation. Thanks also to Janine Mossuz-Lavau, Pierre Muller,
Florence Haegel, Serge Paugam, Maxime Forest, RainbowMurray and Chantal Maille for their
precious help and encouragement.
2 Cf. the texts of the so-called parity laws: constitutional law no. 99-569 of 8 July 1999, on equality
between men and women, including a presentation of what motivated the law; law no. 2000-493
of 6 June 2000, stating that equal access for women and men to elected offices and functions
(Journal Officiel, 7 June 2000) is to be promoted; organic law no. 2000-612 of July 4, 2000,
stating that equal access for women and men to provincial assemblies and the Congress of New
Caledonia, the assembly of French Polynesia, and the territorial assembly of the Wallis and
Fortuna islands is to be promoted (Journal Officiel, 5 July 2000); and law no. 2007-128 of 31
January 2007 (Journal Officiel, 1 February 2007), stating that equal access for women and men
to elected offices and functions is to be promoted.
3 Cf. the 2nd and 3rd public parliament discussion sessions for 15 December 1998, the 2nd and
3rd sessions for 25 January 2000, and the 2nd session for 30 March 2000; also the Senate debates
of 29 February, 25 April, and 20 June 2000 (Assemble´e Nationale).
4 For the PS see in particular the Contribution au Congre`s PS de Grenoble of November 2000
(conference entitled ‘Dialoguer, Diagnostiquer, De´cider Ensemble’), the Contribution the´matique
au Congre`s de Dijon of October 2003 (conference entitled ‘Pour un nouveau fe´minisme’) and the
party’s proposed ‘De´claration de principes’ of April 2008. For the UMP, see the document
Direction des e´tudes de l’UMP pour la Convention du 7 mars 2006.
5 See also the six reports of the Observatoire de la Parite´ dating from 2001, especially
Zimmermann 2005, and the 2008 press kit (Observatoire de la parite´, 2008).
6 The Centre Fe´minin d’Etudes et d’Information (CFEI) was founded on 5 November 1965, on
the initiative of General de Gaulle. According to the statement in the Journal Officiel of 15
November 1965, its purpose was to ‘promote the civic and social education of women.’ The
association began with 70 members, most of whom were former women Resistance fighters. In
1967, a newspaper entitled Femmes Avenir was created. In 1974, during the presidency of
Florence d’Harcourt, the association took the name CFEI-Femmes Avenir and opened sections
in several de´partements (see Papon, 2004, 59–62).
7 In using this expression, Genevie`ve Fraisse reverses Kant’s notion of the relation between true
theory and false practice. As she sees it, parity is true in practice though false in theory.
8 (In the French political system, every candidate for parliament runs with a substitute (supple´ant)
who will be available to take a successful candidate’s place as MP if he or she is appointed to the
executive or dies.)
9 See statements in the Senate by Daniel Hoeffel and Anne Heinis, Compte Rendu Analytique
Officiel no. 59, Tuesday, 29 February 2000, 26–27 and 34–36.
10 In contrast, analysis of the impact that feminization of the body of elected officials has had
on the legislative agenda — alongside the problematic issue of quotas — is a major focus of
gender-in-politics studies, particularly in English-speaking and Northern European countries.
These studies often take their cue from legislative studies, which have become a genuine
subdiscipline of political science. Legislative studies produced the theory of ‘critical mass,’
developed on the basis of the Scandinavian example in the late 1980s (Dahlerup, 1988), a theory
touched up recently on the basis of comparative study results (Lovenduski and Norris, 1993,
2001; Thomas, 1994; Bratton, 2005; Childs and Krook, 2006; Dahlerup, 2006). In France, the
first legislative studies conference, held in September 2007, demonstrated how fragmented the
field is, while analysis of the substantive dimension of political representation remains marginal
because it is spontaneously associated with an essentialist viewpoint. For a more recent overview
of international-level gender studies of political representation, see Galligan (2007).
11 Christine Boutin, a member of the UMP candidate selection commission at the time, was one of the
few persons to denounce the parity legislation as a ‘gadget measure’ (the others were Dominique
Lidar, in charge of the UMP Haute-Pyre´ne´es section (de´partement 65), and Michel Azot, UMP
de´partement 65 official in charge of training). Boutin considers the legislation demagogic and
counter-productive: ‘Besides the fact that it’s an offense against dignity, it has served no purpose.
That doesn’t surprise me — first, because I don’t believe in spontaneous generation, second,
because women have not decided yet. That’s a reality that some would like to erase. You can’t ask a
women — a manual worker, a manager or even a business owner — to get up on a platform
overnight.’ She sees the law not as helping to accelerate an increase in women’s presence in politics
but as counterproductive stigmatization that puts France in a situation of failure.
12 (In the French political system, all elected officials have a mandat e´lectoral (elected office) but
only those in positions of executive power have a fonction elective).
13 Jean-Pierre Cheve`nement, speech to the Senate, Compte Rendu Analytique Officiel no. 59,
Tuesday, 29 February 2000, 4.
14 Politicians’ resistance is clearly illustrated by the remarks of the Socialist MP for the Hautes-
Pyre´ne´es, Pierre Forgues, who sees parity as ‘an instance of intellectual violence’ that precludes
any critical view of women in politics. He asserts: ‘Politics is not a matter of ethnicity, skin color
or sex. Politics is first of all a commitment to serve an ideology, and others. I don’t want to
choose an elected official because they’re white or a woman but because they advocate ideas that
go beyond the person.’ Josette Durrieu, senator and elections secretary for the PS Haute-
Pyre´ne´es de´partement section, also expressed reservations about the value of a law that does not
take into account the fact that being a political actor is the fruit of a struggle and not the
product of a quota rule.
15 The expression ‘Stockholm syndrome’ alludes to the fact that in integrating dominant political
norms — the implication being that those norms are gendered and in this case, male — women
symbolically identify with their executioner. Miche`le Barzach’s experience illustrates this
relation of domination between male politicians and women, who only exist politically on
condition that men sponsor, support or, at very least, tolerate them.
16 On the impact of gender stereotypes on electoral choice, see Heldlund et al., (1979, 513–524),
and Fridkin-Kahn (1996).
17 On this point, see the studies published in the framework of the Research Network on Gender
and the State, begun in 1995 and supervised by Amy Mazur, and the MAGEEQ project, and
co-funded by the European Commission from 2003–2007, two research networks that study
‘state feminism’ and public policy instruments related to the issue of equality.
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